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1

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

*

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

Case No. 890554-CA

:

ROBERT M. BROWN,
:
DAVID E. ELKINS, &
SUSAN B. ELKINS,
:
Defendants-Appellants. :

Category No. 2

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from guilty pleas by each defendant to
one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (1990).

This Court has jurisdiction to hear

the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp.
1989), as the appeal is from a district court in a criminal case
not involving a conviction for a first degree felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

The standard of review to examine a trial court's

determination of the sufficiency of an affidavit in support of a
search warrant is whether the lower court was clearly in error.
State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
2.

Whether the trial court correctly determined that

the affidavit in support of the search warrant established
probable cause for the search.

3.

Whether the Leon good faith exception is applicable

to this case.
4.

Whether the trial court correctly determined that

the affidavit in support of the search warrant did not contain
false and misleading information.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies is included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendants David E. Elkins and Susan L. Elkins

were

originally charged with one count of production of a controlled
substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(i) (1990), and one count of unlawful possession
of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1990) (Record contained in the
court file of Robert M. Brown [hereinafter B.R.] at 15-16).
Defendant Robert M. Brown was originally charged with unlawful
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann* § 58-378(1)(a)(iv) (1990) (B.R. at 20). Counsel for all three
defendants throughout these proceedings has been Herschel Bullen
(B.R. at 55).

Throughout the trial record, Susan Elkins' middle initial is
given variously as ML" or "B". Since she signed her name as
Susan L. Elkins on the Statement of Defendant, the State will use
that initial in the body of this brief (Record contained in the
court file of David E. Elkins and Susan B. Elkins [hereinafter
E.R. at 54).

On March 3, 1989, defendants filed a motion to suppress
evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant (B.R. at 55).

A

hearing on that motion was conducted March 8, 1989, in the Third
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Frank
G. Noel, district judge, presiding (E.R. at 13 and Transcript of
hearing [hereinafter Tr.]).

Before and after the hearing,

counsel for the opposing parties filed memoranda and affidavits
in support of their respective positions (B.R. at 87-114 and E.R.
at 15-20 and 27-34).

Based on the hearing and the documents, the

trial court denied the motion to suppress and entered findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and an order to that effect (E.R. at
36-39; a copy of this material is attached as Addendum A ) .
Subsequently, on May 22, 1989, the State filed amended
informations against defendants, charging Brown with unlawful
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute,
or, in the alternative, unlawful possession of a controlled
substance, each a third degree felony (B.R. at 118-19).

The

Elkins were charged with production of a controlled substance,
or, in the alternative, unlawful possession of a controlled
substance, each a third degree felony (E.R. at 24-25).

Following

remand and a waiver of preliminary hearing, the defendants each
entered conditional guilty pleas to one count of possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute. (B.R. at 125-28;
E.R. at 42; and transcript of change of plea hearing, July 28,
1989).
On September 5, 1989, Judge Noel sentenced each
defendant to a term not to exceed five years in the Utah State

Prison.

The sentences were stayed and defendants placed on

probation for two years with certain conditions (B.R. at 153-54
and E.R. at 58-61).

Notices of appeal were filed and

certificates of probable cause were signed for each defendant on
September 6, 1989 (B.R. at 155-57 and E.R. at 64-73).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On November 4, 1988, Robert Williams telephoned an
organization called Crime Solvers and reported that marijuana was
present at 1268 and 1276 Montgomery, Salt Lake City, Utah (Tr. at
84).

Crime Solvers contacted Metro Narcotics Task Force who then

contacted Mr. Williams about his report (Tr. at 84 and 40-43).
Detective David Jensen obtained information from Mr. Williams
about the houses at the addresses given.

Mr. Williams described

the homes and the attached greenhouses, and told about marijuana
being grown and sold from that area.

He also told the detective

about the relationship he had to the defendants, although this
relationship was not explained in the affidavit (Tr. at 44).
Detective Jensen, along with Detective Robert Caffery,
went to the addresses to attempt to verify the information which
they had been given (Tr. at 44 and 60). At the addresses given,
the officers found a common driveway between the homes and found
the attached greenhouses just as they had been advised (Tr. at
45-46 and 60-62).

The officers approached the backs of the

houses along a canal bank which is a public right of way (Tr. at
46 and 60).

As they approached 1276 Montgomery, they both

smelled a "pungent" aroma of marijuana (Tr. at 49 and 60).

Both

officers had had experience in drug enforcement and were able to
identify the odor (Tr. at 50-52 and 60-62).

As the officers looked at the greenhouses from the
canal bank, they were able to see a plant pressed against the
translucent panel material of one of the greenhouses (Tr. at 49
and 63). To their trained eyes, the plant had the appearance of
marijuana (Tr. at 49, 63 and 70).
Based on this information, the officers went to the
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office and received help in preparing
a search warrant and affidavit (Tr. at 56 and 66, a copy of the
search warrant and affidavit are attached as Addendum B).

The

officers had no reason to believe that the affidavit or search
warrant were defective (Tr. at 57 and 66).

Officer Caffery, who

swore to and signed the affidavit, considered it to be truthful
(Tr. at 66).
The search warrant was executed and marijuana was found
in both homes (B.R. at 144-49).

The plant in the greenhouse,

which the officers thought might have been marijuana, turned out
to be a different kind of plant of similar appearance, but not
marijuana (Tr. at 65-66 and 70).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Statements of citizen informants are to be accorded an
assumption of reliability.

That assumption, coupled with the

corroborating evidence gathered by the officers and included in
the affidavit, provided sufficient information to support a
finding of probable cause for issuance of the search warrant in
this case.
Even if the information contained in the affidavit did
not support a finding of probable cause, it was sufficient to

support the officers' objective reliance on the warrant to search
the houses of defendants.
The trial court correctly determined that defendants
had not proven that the officers knowingly or recklessly included
any false statements in their affidavit.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT ESTABLISHED
SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUPPORT THE
ISSUANCE OF THE SEARCH WARRANT.
Defendants first claim that the affidavit was
insufficient to support a finding of probable cause by the
magistrate who issued the search warrant.

This argument is based

on an allegation that the affidavit did not establish the
reliability of the informant or the basis of the informant's
knowledge about the cultivation of marijuana at the defendants'
houses.
A.

Standard of Review.

The standard of reviewing the sufficiency of an
affidavit in support of a search warrant has been explicated by
this Court in State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).

This Court said;
When a search warrant is subsequently
challenged on the grounds that it was issued
without the requisite probable cause, as in
this case, "the fourth amendment does not
require that the reviewing court conduct a de
novo review of the magistrates' probable
cause determination." rState v.] Babbell, 770
P.2d [987] at 991 [(Utah 1989)]. Rather, the
determination is "whether the magistrate had
a substantial basis to conclude that in the
totality of circumstances the affidavit
adequately established probable cause for the

issuance of a search warrant." State v.
Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 129 (Utah 1987).
Moreover, in making this determination, the
reviewing court is to give the magistrate's
decision "great deference." Id. (quoting
Gates, 462 U.S. at 236).

Our role in reviewing that determination is
limited: "Because a trial court is in an
advantageous position to assess witness
credibility, 'we will not disturb its factual
assessment underlying a decision to . . .
deny a suppression motion unless it clearly
appears that the lower court was in error.'"
rState v.] Droneberg, 120 Utah Adv. Rep. 27,
28 [(Utah Ct. App. October 20, 1989)]
(quoting State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258
(Utah 1987)). Clear error is indicated when
the trial court's factual assessment is
against the clear weight of the evidence or
induces a firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed. Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1258.
Stromberq, 783 P.2d at 57. Applying this standard of review, it
is clear that the trial court correctly denied defendants' motion
to suppress the evidence.
B.

Probable Cause Determination.

The probable cause standard is settled in federal and
Utah law to mean just that—a probability, not a certainty.

The

United States Supreme Court said:
[I]t is clear that "only the probability, and
not a prima facie showing, of criminal
activity is the standard of probable cause."
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983) (quoting Spinelli v.
United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969).

The appellate courts of

this state have consistently followed the holding of the United
States Supreme Court regarding
the test to determine whether an affidavit
establishes the necessary probable cause:

The task of the issuing magistrate is
simply to make a practical, commonsense
decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit
before him, including the 'veracity' and
'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying
hearsay information, there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of
a crime will be found in a particular
place. And the duty of a reviewing court
is simply to ensure that the magistrate
had a 'substantial basis for . . .
concluding]' that probable cause existed.
[Gates 462 U.S.] at 238-39 (quoting Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 . . .
(1960) .
State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Utah Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983)).

See also State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d

1258, 1261 (Utah 1983), and State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099,
1101 (Utah 1985) (adopting the Gates "totality of the
circumstances" standard for reviewing affidavits for search
warrants).
In the present case, information that controlled
substances were present in houses belonging to defendants came to
the police from a citizen.

In Miller, this Court addressed a

claim that an affidavit "failed to address the veracity or
reliability of the unidentified informant neighbors."
at 1366.

This Court said:
Although no longer a required test under the
Gates standard, the veracity or reliability
of an informant is still a relevant
consideration when reviewing the totality of
the circumstances. . . . However, the
average neighbor witness is not the type of
informant in need of independent proof of
reliability or veracity. Rather, "[v]eracity
is generally assumed when the information
comes from an 'average citizen who is in a
position to supply information by virtue of

740 P.2d

having been a crime victim or witness.'"
State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 180 (Utah
1983) (quoting LaFave, Search and Seizure §
3.3 (1978)).
740 P.2d at 1366 (other citations omitted).

In Miller, the

officers had "corroborated virtually all of the information
received from the neighbors through their independent
investigation and surveillance."

_Id. This corroboration was

coupled with the assumed veracity of a citizen informant and
validated the probable cause determination of the issuing
magistrate in that case.

See also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.

213, 237-38 (1983) ("[Anonymous] tips, particularly when
supplemented by independent police investigation, frequently
contribute to the solution of otherwise 'perfect crimes.'");
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959) (when officer
had personally verified the rest of the information given by the
informant, he had probable cause to believe the unverified
information; i.e., that defendant was carrying drugs); State v.
Stromberq, 783 P.2d 54, 57-58 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (informant
akin to "average neighbor witness" and veracity assumed); State
v. Treadway, 499 P.2d 846, 848 (Utah 1972) (veracity not subject
to strict scrutiny); Effenbeck v. State, 700 P.2d 811, 812-14
(Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (reasoning behind lessened need for
verification of anonymous tip from citizen informant).
In the case now before this Court, the Metro Narcotics
Task Force received information from a citizen, through an agency
called Crime Solvers, that marijuana, mushrooms and paraphernalia
for cultivating those plants would be found at 1268 and 1276
Montgomery, Salt Lake City, Utah (Affidavit for search warrant,

Addendum B).

While the informant's name was not included in the

affidavit, the informant had given his name to Crime Solvers so
it was known to the officers.

The informant told Crime Solvers

that the Elkins lived at 1268 Montgomery and also owned the
vacant adjacent property at 1276 Montgomery.

The informant had

"confronted" children who were carrying baggies of marijuana from
the residences (Affidavit, Addendum B ) .
The veracity of the informant was bolstered by the
informant's willingness to give his name to Crime Solvers, not
merely to remain anonymous.

That the name was not given in the

affidavit did not negate effect of the fact that he did give it.
Thus, he was more than an anonymous informant.

The affidavit

states that the informant has a particularized interest in one of
the children, although it does not give specific details about
that interest (Affidavit, Addendum B)..

Apparently, an effort

was made to protect the identity of the informant at that
juncture, while still providing sufficient information to justify
issuance of the search warrant.
As in the cases cited above, the officers did not
merely rely upon the information given them by the informant.
They corroborated the information and listed their corroboration
2
in the affidavit.

Officer Caffery

and other officers confirmed

the information that David Elkins owned both homes; they verified
"many small details" about the property, such as the greenhouses
In his brief, defendant claims that the warrant was executed
by "an unknown Affiant"; however, he then names Robert Caffery as
the affiant (Brief of Appellant at 11). The affidavit carries
the signature of Officer Caffery as affiant.

attached to the rear of both homes.

The officers walked on a

canal bank behind the homes and saw what appeared to be marijuana
plants and leaves silhouetted against a translucent panel in one
of the greenhouses.

They also smelled the "pervasive" and

"unique smell of large quantities of green marijuana" as they
walked past the backyards and the greenhouses (Affidavit,
Addendum B ) .
Defendants also complain that the date of the
informant's and the officers' observations were not given in the
affidavit.

While it would have been preferable for that
3

information to have been included in the affidavit , it's
omission is not fatal to the warrant.
that the information was stale.

There was no allegation

The information supported an

inference that the cultivation of marijuana was an ongoing
activity.

In Stromberq, this Court said:
["W]here the affidavit properly recites facts
indicating activity of a protracted and
continuous nature, a course of conduct, the
passage of time becomes less significant.["]

783 P.2d at 57 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 461 F.2d 285,
287 (10th Cir. 1972)).

The information that defendants used

their homes and attached greenhouses to grow marijuana and
mushrooms, and that the informant had confronted children
bringing baggies of marijuana from the houses indicate activity
of a continuous nature.

This makes the omission of the time of

Testimony at the suppression hearing was that the phone call
to Crime Solvers and the corroboration all occurred on the day
the warrant was issued (Tr. at 41 and 60).

observation and corroboration from the affidavit less
significant.
While the information and corroboration in this case
may not have supported a finding of "certain knowledge" that
contraband existed at the houses, it did support a determination
of probable cause.

State v. Tappf 26 Utah 2d 392, 490 P.2d 334,

337 (1971).
POINT II
EVEN IF THIS SEARCH WARRANT WERE TO BE FOUND
TO BE DEFECTIVE, THE EVIDENCE FOUND IN THE
SEARCH IS STILL ADMISSIBLE UNDER UNITED
STATES V. LEON.
Defendants next claim that the trial court erred in
determining that the officers acted in good faith under United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), when they executed the
search warrant in this matter (E.R. at 38).

This claim is based

solely on defendants' allegation that the affidavit lacked
probable cause for its issuance, as argued in Point I of their
brief.

While in Point III of their brief defendants allege that

the affidavit contains false and misleading statements, they do
not analyze the good faith exception of Leon on that basis.
Consequently, the State will only address the probable cause
argument in the good faith context.
United State v. Leon first expressed a good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule for evidence seized pursuant
to an illegal search.

The deterrent effect of exclusion of the

evidence is aimed at law enforcement agents, not magistrates.
468 U.S. at 917-18.

If a magistrate incorrectly determines that

probable cause has been established and issues the warrant, an

officer usually can rely on that determination; punishing an
officer for the magistrate's error does not accomplish the
purposes of the exclusionary rule,

468 U.S. at 921-22.

However,

the officer's reliance on the magistrate's determination must be
"objectively reasonable[.]"

468 U.S. at 922.

The Supreme Court listed certain circumstances in which
the good faith exception would not apply.

The circumstance upon

which defendants rely in this case is stated as:
Nor would an officer manifest objective good
faith in relying on a warrant based on an
affidavit "so lacking in indicia of probable
cause as to render official belief in its
existence entirely unreasonable."
468 U.S. at 923 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11
(1975)).
As was noted in Point I, the information given in the
affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause for issuance
of the warrant.

Defendants' contention that the information

would not have been admissible in court and thus cannot support a
finding of probable cause is not well taken.

The United States

Supreme Court has consistently reiterated that "a finding of
'probable cause' may rest upon evidence which is not legally
competent in a criminal trial."

United States v. Ventresca, 380

U.S. 102, 107 (1965) (citing Draper v. United States, 358 U.S.
307, 311 (1959).
Even if this court were to find that the information
given in the affidavit was insufficient to establish probable
cause, the information is not so lacking as to make the officers'
reliance thereon unreasonable.

The courts have determined that

reliance upon "bare bones" affidavits is unreasonable and thus
the good faith exception would not apply.

In Leon/ the affidavit

"related the results of an extensive investigation" and "provided
evidence sufficient to create disagreement among thoughtful and
competent judges as to the existence of probable cause."

468

U.S. at 926. Wholly conclusory statements in affidavits in
previous cases were found to be insufficient to establish
probable cause.

Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933);

Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).

The affidavit in the

present case is not so conclusory or bare that an objectively
reasonable officer would have doubted that probable cause
existed.

The affidavit contained the statements of a citizen

informant who had stated that defendants used the houses and
greenhouses to grow controlled substances and had seen children
leaving the houses with marijuana.

The affidavit also gave

corroborating information from the officers' own observations,
including verification of details of the informant's statements
and the officers' own observations of a marijuana-type plant and
the odor of marijuana near the houses. A magistrate and a
district court judge determined that this supported a probable
cause finding.

Even assuming arguendo that this was not enough

to establish probable cause, it was at least sufficient to
support the officers' good faith reliance on the warrant signed
by a neutral and detached magistrate.

POINT III
THE AFFIDAVIT DID NOT CONTAIN ANY KNOWINGLY
FALSE OR MISLEADING INFORMATION.
Defendants' final claim is that the officers included
false and misleading information in the affidavit and thus the
evidence must be suppressed.

The leading case in Utah on this

issue is State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986), cert.
denied, 480 U.S. 930 (1987).

In that case, the Utah Supreme

Court, citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), said:
In Franks, the United States Supreme Court
held that a defendant is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing to challenge the validity
of a search warrant if the defendant can
establish that (i) an affiant in an affidavit
supporting a search warrant made a false
statement intentionally, knowingly, or with
reckless disregard for the truth, and (ii)
the affidavit is insufficient to support a
finding of probable cause after the
misstatement is set aside. 483 U.S. 171-72.
By an extension of reasoning, the same test
applies when a misstatement occurs because
information is omitted; the affidavit must be
evaluated to determine if it will support a
finding of probable cause when the omitted
information is inserted. . . . If an
affidavit fails to support a finding of
probable cause after the false statements are
excised or the omitted information is added,
i.e., if the omission or misstatement
materially affects the finding of probable
cause, any evidence obtained under the
improperly issued warrant must be suppressed.
Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191 (citations omitted).

In the affidavit

in the present case, the officers did not include "a false
statement intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless disregard
for the truth."

483 U.S. at 171-72.

The statements challenged by defendants were that:
Large plants were evident through the
translucent panels in the greenhouse
including one pressed against the panel that
had the silhouette of a marijuana leaf. The
unique smell of large quantities of green
marijuana was pervasive as your affiant and
officer Caffery [Jensen?] walked past the
backyards and the greenhouse.
(Affidavit, Addendum B).

Defendants have not established that

these statements were false.

The affidavit reads that large

plants were apparent through the translucent panel and that one
leaf pressed against the panel had the "silhouette of a marijuana
leaf."

Testimony at the suppression hearing established that the

plants in the greenhouse were not marijuana.

However, there was

a vine in the greenhouse and the leaves against the panel were
similar to marijuana leaves (Tr. at 49-50, 65-66, and 70). The
similarity between the plants found and marijuana supports the
trial court's determination that defendants "did not prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the affidavit contained false
statements that were known to be false or made with reckless
disregard of the truth."

(E.R. at 37-38, Addendum A ) .

At the suppression hearing, defendants challenged the
officers' statements that they smelled marijuana from the
backyard of the residences.

However, they did not prove that

those statements were false; neither have they analyzed that
contention in their brief.

Thus, the trial court's determination

that no false statements regarding the odor of marijuana were
knowingly or recklessly made has not been properly challenged on
appeal.

Because defendants have not carried their burden to
prove that false statements were intentionally, knowing or
recklessly made in the affidavit, the trial court did not err in
admitting the evidence seized in the search-

Nielsen, 727 P.2d

at 191.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
that this Court affirm defendants' convictions and sentences.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ,^ir" day of May, 1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

L'lv,

CHARLENE BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to
Herschel Bullen, MCDONALD & BULLEN, Attorneys for defendants, The
Hermes Building, 455 East 500 South, Suite 200, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111, this

I-P-' day of May, 1990.

ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

JUN - 1 1989
S/-4.T C M x

-B*

THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRIC^uryc,erk
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
v,

Case Nos. CR 89-18,
89-19 & 89-20

ROBERT M. BROWN,
DAVID E. ELKINS, and
SUSAN L. ELKINS

Honorable Frank G. Noel
Defendants.
The defendants filed a Motion to Suppress on February 27,
1989,

with

a

supporting

memorandum.

opposing memorandum on March 6, 1989.

The

State

submitted

an

An evidentiary hearing was

presented to the Court on March 8, 1989, and the parties submitted
post-evidentiary hearing memoranda.

By minute entry of April 5,

1989, the Court denied the motion, and counsel for the parties
were notified of this ruling as of May 12, 1989.

The following

sets forth the Court's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
order pertaining to Defendants' Motion to Suppress.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On November

4, 1988, Judge Dennis Fuchs

of the

Third Circuit Court approved and issued a search warrant to search
the premises of 1268 and 1276 Montgomery Street in Salt Lake City,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDER
Case No's. CR 89-18, 89-19, 89-20
Page two

2.

The

search

warrant

described

the

property

to

be

seized as "marijuana plants, psychedelic mushrooms, paraphernalia
used for growing, harvesting, and processing these plants,"
3.

Detective

Robert

Caffery,

who

was

at

that

time

assigned to the Salt Lake Metro Narcotics Strike Force, submitted
to Judge Fuchs an affidavit that Detective Caffery had signed in
support of the search warrant.
4.

There

are

statements contained

no

knowing

or

reckless

in Detective Caffery's

material

affidavit

false

in support

of the search warrant.
5.
at

1268

and

The search warrant was executed on November 4, 1988
1272

Montgomery

Street.

Marijuana

was

found

and

obtained

and

seized at both addresses as well as other relevant items.
6.

The

law

enforcement

personnel

who

executed the warrant considered the warrant to be valid and relied
upon it as authorizing the search conducted in this case.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
should

The

affidavit

be considered

in

support

of

the

search

warrant

in its entirety because the defendants did

not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the affidavit
contained

false

statements

that were

known

to be false or made
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with

reckless

disregard

U.S. 154 (1978);
2.
and,

of

the

truth.

Franks

The search warrant was supported by probable cause,

accordingly,

the search warrant

was valid under

to the United

States

Article I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
U.S.

1985) .

213

438

State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986).

and Fourteenth Amendments

462

v. Delaware,

(1983);

Therefore,

State

the

v.

evidence

Anderson,
seized

the Fourth

Constitution

and

Illinois v. Gates,

701

P.2d

pursuant

to

1099
the

(Utah
search

warrant should not be suppressed.
3.
this

Because the peace officers obtaining

search warrant

the warrant,

acted

the evidence

in objectively
also

the good faith doctrine applies.

and executing

reasonable

reliance on

should not be suppressed

because

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.

897 (1984).
ORDER
Based
counsel,

upon

the

points

the evidence presented,

and

authorities

the foregoing

submitted

findings

by

of fact

and conclusions of law, and the Court being fully advised in the
premises, it is hereby
ORDERED, that
it hereby is DENIED;

the Defendants' Motion to Suppress be and

and it is further

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDER
Case No's. CR 89-18, 89-19, 89-20
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ORDERED, that the evidence seized pursuant to the search
warrant at issue here shall not be suppressed.
DATED this

/t>

day of May, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE FRANK G. NOI
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
SMM/SC/0066U

ADDENDUM B

DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
HOWARD R. LEMCKE
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Fhcne: (801) 363-7900

IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SEARCH WARRANT

(X)\<M

NO.

COUKTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
To any peace officer in the State of Utah,
Froof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me
bypCT. fo5tf(T C^fiF^y
, I am' satisfied that there is probable
cause to believe, '
That
(X) on the premises known as 1268 Montgomery, one story
brown brick residence, 1276 Montgomery, one story red
brick residence, with a common driveway and backyard,
the curtilage of both and a white shed behind 1268
Montgomery,
In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State
is now certain property or evidence described as:

of

Utah,

there

Marijuana plants, psychedelic mushrooms, paraphernalia used
for growing, harvesting, and processing these plants,
and that said property or evidence:
(X)
(X)
(X)
(X)

was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, or
has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, or .
is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a
means of committing or concealing a public offense, or
consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct.

You are therefore commanded:
(X)

_ _^

in the day time, until «S-5n;u"~p.m.

to make a search of the above-named or described premises for the
herein-above described property or evidence and if you find the same

PJ\GE 2

SEARCH « « * « «
h

rift
eo£

to b r i n g i t forthwith

u 6
cp ur oc pu ei >r t-y -in , o u r custody, s » J " "
property m , o u r

b.*or«m.i

^

dav„o^ovemberr
d a v,.c^ovember r

^ MY HAND
and d a t e d t h i s _,ZL- , , £ ^ . / ; - .
D
, » % ' ^ ^
GI VEW UNDER MY hAN

/

„

such

,0oo
1.81
1988.

^IHOOO n
AVID E. YOCOM
alt Lake County Attorney
CWARD R. LEMCKE
•euuty Salt Lake County Attorney
31 East 400 South
•alt Lake City, Utah 84111
hone: (601) 363-7900

IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SA.LT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
?TATE OF UTAH

)

bounty of Salt Lake

)
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT

BEFORE:

D*** «

/~IL/J

JUDGE

450 South 2nd East
ADDRESS

The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he has reason to believe
That
(X) on the premises kncwn^as 1268 Montgomery, fane story
brown brick residence,^ 1276 Montgomeryf a one story red
brick residence, with a common driveway and backyard,
the curtliage of both and a white shed behind 1268
Montgomery,
In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there
is now certain property or evidence described as:
Marijuana plants, psychedelic mushrooms, paraphernalia
for growing, harvesting, and processing these plants,

used

and that said property or evidence:
(X)
(X)
(X)
(X)

was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, or
has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, or
is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a
means of committing or concealing a public offense, or
consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct.

Affiant
believes the property and evidence described above is
evidence of the crime(s> of cultivation and possession of controlled
substances.

FACE 2
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
The
are

facts

to

establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant

A phone call was made to Crime Solvers, by their informant
6637 who identified himself to Crime Solvers. 6637 stated
a David and Susan Elkins lived in 1268 Montgomery and owned
the adjacent property 1276 Montgomery that was vacant.
That they used both homes and their attached greenhouses to
grow Marijuana and psychedelic mushrooms. 6637 stated that
he has confronted children who have possessed baggies of
marijuana brought from these buildings.
Your affiant and other officers walked down a canal that
runs behind these two properties. The two houses were seen
to possess ""many small details 6637 described to Crime
Solvers. Large plants were evident through the translucent
panels in the greenhouse including one pressed against the
panel that had the silhouette of a marijuana leaf.
The
unique smell of large quantities of green marijuana was
pervasive as your affiant and officer Caffery walked past
the backyards and the greenhouse.
Your
affiant
considers
the
information
received
from
the
confidential informant reliable because he fully identified himself
to Crime Solver. Ke has a particularized interest in the welfare of
one of the children.
Your
affiant
has
verified
the
above
confidential informant to be correct and
following independent investigation:

information from
accurate throuah

the
the

Ey confirming through public utilities that David Elkins
owns both homes. Ey walking by and confirming much detail
of 6637' s a c c o u n t ^ ^ C ^ T^/*T £«OsM«Msesj*JfcCt w^OrtrO-rp Tr^ortOf- ^Tri Pr^eS,
affiant pravs that a Search Warrant be issued for the
WHEREFORE, the
seizure of said items:
J-:
p .m.
(X) in the day time, until'

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO EEFORE ME this

$Sf£z'y(hjL]jl6^e^er,

1988

^-•i:>-

..<• v
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